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In a framework closely related to Diamond and Rajan (2001) we characterize di®erent
¯nancial systems and analyze the welfare implications of di®erent LOLR-policies in
these ¯nancial systems. We show that in a bank-dominated ¯nancial system it is less
likely that a LOLR-policy that follows the Bagehot rules is preferable. In ¯nancial
systems with rather illiquid assets a discretionary individual liquidity assistance might
be welfare improving, while in market-based ¯nancial systems, with rather liquid assets
in the banks' balance sheets, emergency liquidity assistance provided freely to the
market at a penalty rate is likely to be e±cient. Thus, a "one size ¯ts all"-approach
that does not take the di®erences of ¯nancial systems into account is misguiding.
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JEL Classi¯cation: D52, E44, E52, E58, G21Non technical summary
In this paper, we take a ¯rst step to investigate which form of liquidity assistance to
banks a lender of last resort should follow given the type of ¯nancial system the banks
are embedded. Nowadays it is well proven fact that even with regard to industrialized
countries ¯nancial systems di®er in many dimensions. As a consequence, a classi¯cation
of ¯nancial systems in market-based or bank-based ¯nancial system emerged. However,
we focus our analysis on one aspect, namely the importance of relationship lending
in market-oriented and bank-dominated ¯nancial systems. Our starting point is that
strong relations between ¯rms and banks are more predominant in bank-based ¯nancial
systems.
First, we develop a taxonomy of crises situations, namely slight, moderate or severe
liquidity crises, whereas the occurrence of a certain crisis situation depends on the
magnitude of the negative macroeconomic shock that causes an aggregate liquidity
shortage. In addition, we argue that the importance of relationship lending has an
in°uence on the occurrence of crises situations as well. Market-based ¯nancial systems
end up more often in light and severe liquidity crises while in bank-based ¯nancial
systems moderate liquidity crises are more likely. The higher marketability of loans in
market-based systems on the one hand is more e±cient in bu®ering small aggregate
shocks, but on the other hand it gives stronger incentives to investors to liquidate their
stakes in the banks in case of a big shock.
In the second part we analyze the welfare implications of di®erent lender of last
resort-policies in these crises situations. We consider two alternatives, i.e. discretionary
individual liquidity assistance to illiquid banks and market interventions provided along
the rules of Bagehot. In comparing both policies, it can be shown that the relative
welfare gains of individual liquidity assistance are higher particularly in moderate liq-
uidity crises. Providing assistance by market interventions leads to a waste of liquidity
since part of it ends up in liquid banks. This waste of liquidity is the more severe
the more illiquid bank loans are. However, individual liquidity assistance is associated
with more cost intense information requirements. Taking higher information costs of
an individual liquidity assistance into account, we come to the conclusion that individ-
ual liquidity assistance may be preferable in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems but not
in market-oriented ¯nancial systems where market interventions might be more appro-
priate. Of course, there are some quali¯cation to this conclusion. Most important, our
model is quiet about possible moral hazard behavior of banks induced by the lender of
last resort-policy. This aspect will be analyzed in future research.Nicht technische Zusammenfassung
Im Rahmen einer modelltheoretischen Analyse gehen wir der Frage nach, inwieweit es
notwendig ist, die Ausgestaltung der nationalen Lender of Last Resort-Politik an dem in
einem Land vorherrschenden Finanzsystemtypus auszurichten. Ausgangspunkt unserer
Analyse ist die inzwischen wissenschaftlich etablierte These, dass sich die Strukturen
der Finanzsysteme industrialisierter LÄ ander stark voneinander unterscheiden, wobei
sich eine Klassi¯kation in bankdominierte oder kapitalmarktorientierte Finanzsysteme
durchgesetzt hat. Diese Unterscheidung bilden wir in unserem Modellrahmen in der
Weise ab, dass Hausbankbeziehungen eine je nach Finanzsystemtyp unterschiedlich
gro¼e Bedeutung zukommt: Bankdominierte Finanzsysteme sind stÄ arker durch diese
Art der Finanzierungsbeziehung geprÄ agt als kapitalmarktorientierte Systeme.
ZunÄ achst charakterisieren wir unterschiedliche Typen von Finanzkrisen (schwere,
moderate und leichte), die je nach Ausma¼ des makroÄ okonomischen LiquiditÄ atsschocks
auftreten. Sie unterscheiden sich darin, inwieweit aufgrund des LiquiditÄ atsengpasses
Finanzierungsbeziehungen vorzeitig abgebrochen werden und/oder es zu Bankenzusam-
menbrÄ uchen kommt. Wir zeigen auf, dass es in durch enge Hausbankbeziehungen
gekennzeichneten Finanzsystemen hÄ au¯ger zu moderaten LiquiditÄ atskrisen kommt,
wÄ ahrend in kapitalmarktorientierten Finanzsystemen Schocks eher in schwache oder
starke LiquiditÄ atskrisen mÄ unden. Die hÄ ohere MarktfÄ ahigkeit der vergebenen Kredite
in kapitalmarktorientierten Finanzsystemen kann kleinere makroÄ okonomische Schocks
zwar besser abpu®ern, fÄ uhrt jedoch bei gro¼en Schocks zu einer hÄ oheren KrisenanfÄ allig-
keit der Banken, da Anleger einen stÄ arkeren Liquidationsanreiz haben.
Im zweiten Schritt untersuchen wir dann, welche Form der LiquiditÄ atsbereitstellung
durch eine Zentralbank in den jeweiligen Krisenszenarien e±zienter ist. Wir zeigen,
dass insbesondere in moderaten Krisen eine individuelle LiquiditÄ atsbereitstellung an
illiquide Banken vorzuziehen ist. Der Grund hierfÄ ur liegt darin, dass eine Marktin-
tervention keine zielgenaue LiquiditÄ atsbereitstellung an illiquide Banken erlaubt. Sie
bringt eine "ine±ziente LiquiditÄ atsverschwendung" mit sich, die umso grÄ o¼er ist, je
illiquider Bankkredite sind. Allerdings geht die individuelle UnterstÄ utzung mit hÄ oheren
Informationserfordernissen fÄ ur die Zentralbank einher. Bei nicht zu hohen Informa-
tionskosten kommen wir somit zu dem Gesamtergebnis, dass in bankdominierten Fi-
nanzsystemen eine Lender of Last Resort-Politik im Sinne einer individuellen Liqui-
ditÄ atsbereitstellung eher angebracht ist, wÄ ahrend in kapitalmarktorientierten Finanz-
systemen eine Marktintervention entlang der Regeln von Bagehot vorzuziehen ist.
Unsere Ergebnisse berÄ ucksichtigen dabei allerdings nicht, in welcher Weise die unter-schiedlichen Formen der LiquiditÄ atsbereitstellung moral hazard auf Seiten der Banken
hervorrufen. Diesen Aspekt wollen wir in einem weiteren Forschungsprojekt integri-
eren.
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1 Introduction
In the last two decades ¯nancial crises, a phenomenon that most observers in the
1970's thought to be a relict of the past, has reawakened the interest of academics and
practitioners. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1973 and the
subsequent wave of deregulation in many countries, ¯nancial crises reemerged. For in-
stance, Lindgren and Saal (1996) found that about three quarter of the IMF's member
countries su®ered some form of banking crises, though panics in the traditional sense
were avoided either by central bank interventions or by explicit or implicit government
guarantees. The experience with crises in Scandinavian countries like Norway, Finland
and Sweden in the 1980's and more recently in East-Asian and Latin-American coun-
tries shows that crises were particularly disruptive in terms of the depth of ensuing
recessions. This explains why the question of how to prevent or handle ¯nancial crises
is one of the most lively debated policy and research issues in the ¯nancial community.
In this debate, largely unanimity prevails that the maintenance of ¯nancial stability
is facilitated by well-designed "safety net" arrangements aimed at both limiting the
risk of disruption in the ¯nancial system (crisis prevention) and the consequences of
disruption if it arises (crisis management). A central element of these arrangements
is the lender of last resort. There is considerable agreement on the need of a lender
of last resort to provide emergency liquidity assistance in reaction to an adverse shock
which causes an abnormal increase in demand for liquidity that cannot be met from
an alternative source. Usually this role of a lender of last resort (LOLR) is assigned to
the central bank.1
¤We would like to thank Jean-Charles Rochet, Elena Carletti, and the participants of the CFS
Summer School 2002, of the conference on "Banking, Financial Stability and the Business Cycle" at
the Sveriges Riksbank 2004, of the seminar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 2004, of the
seminar at the Deutsche Bundesbank 2004, and of the European Economic Association Meeting in
Madrid 2004 for stimulating discussions and very helpful comments. The views expressed herein are
those of the authors and not those of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
1See for a discussion of the lender of last resort function(s) Freixas, X. et al. (November 1999). We
do not want to touch the issue if there should (and could) be an institutional separation between a
central bank which is responsible for the conduct of monetary policy and a lender of last resort; on
this topic see Goodhart (1995). Also we do not analyze the potential agency con°icts between deposit
insurance fund, central bank and bank supervisors; on this see Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos
(2001).
1However, the question arises what are the principles that a lender of last resort
is supposed to follow. As far back as 1873, Bagehot (1873), based on the work by
Thornton (1802), formulated rules of a lender of last resort policy. He suggested that
in a crisis, the lender of last resort should lend freely, at a penalty rate, on the basis of
collateral that is marketable in the ordinary cause of business when there is no panic.2
Especially, to discourage risk taking by individual institutions the view holds that the
lender of last resort should lend whenever possible only to the market at penalty rate
and only against good collateral. By this maxim the doctrine of what a lender of last
resort should do today is still well-captured besides coming under some criticism by
authors like Goodhart (1999) or Giannini (1999).3
In this paper, we take a ¯rst step to investigate if such a "one size ¯ts all"-approach
with respect to lender of last resort policy makes much sense having in mind the di®er-
ences between ¯nancial systems of various countries. This issue while very important
is highly complex because as the literature on comparative ¯nancial systems shows,
there are many dimensions in which ¯nancial systems di®er.4 However, we focus our
very simple analysis on one dimension, namely the di®erences in the importance of
relationship banking in market-oriented and bank-dominated ¯nancial systems. Our
research question is the following: Given that ¯nancial structures di®er in this aspect
across countries, shouldn't also the lender of last resort policies with respect to the
form of liquidity assistance to the ¯nancial system be di®erent?
More speci¯cally, we build our analysis on the Diamond/Rajan-framework and use
this modelling structure as our starting point to incorporate certain stylized facts on
di®erences between bank- and market-based ¯nancial systems.5 The approach will be
extended to explore what happens to the functioning of a ¯nancial system if there
is an aggregate shortage of liquidity - if the supply of liquid assets is small relative
to aggregate liquidity demand. We are able to de¯ne di®erent cases for the resulting
equilibrium on the market for liquidity and thus develop a taxonomy of crises situations.
This gives us some hints on the probabilities and welfare consequences of certain crises
situations in the respective ¯nancial systems. In turn this allows us to give a ¯rst
assessment of the type of interventions a lender of last resort should follow. Especially,
2See for instance Fischer (1999), Giannini (1999) and Goodhart (1999) for a discussion of these
rules.
3See for instance Fischer (1999).
4See Allen and Gale (2001) for a recent survey. This literature includes theoretical analysis, e.g.
Allen and Gale (2000), as well as more empirically oriented work such as Franks and Mayer (1995)
and Hackethal, Schmidt, and Tyrell (2002)
5See Diamond and Rajan (2001) for the basic framework and Diamond and Rajan (2002) for an
application to banking crises.
2the question when - if at all - the lender of last resort should charge a penalty interest
rate and if the lender of last resort should lend only to the market or to individual
institutions, will be analyzed with regard to the di®erent ¯nancial systems. Our main
result is that under reasonable assumptions individual liquidity assistance to banks
is preferable in bank-dominated ¯nancial system while in market-oriented systems a
policy following Bagehot's rules should be pursued.
Of course, we are not the ¯rst who discuss optimal lender of last resort policy
and especially the classical market doctrine of the lender of last resort.6 But to our
knowledge we are the ¯rst who analyze in a theoretical framework the interrelation-
ship between characteristic di®erences of ¯nancial system con¯gurations and adequate
lender of last resort policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our frame-
work. In section 3 the stability of an individual bank will be investigated. It follows an
analysis of the equilibrium in the liquidity market in section 4. In section 5 we describe
the optimal lender of last resort policy. Section 6 concludes.
2 The framework
2.1 The setup
Following Diamond and Rajan (2001) we consider an economy with three dates (t =
0;1;2) and a large number of entrepreneurs, bankers and investors. Entrepreneurs
are wealthless, however each of them has a project at his disposal which requires
an investment I = 1 at t = 0. Each investor is endowed with a small amount of
consumption good in comparison to the required investment size, hence we need many
investors to fund a project. In addition, we assume that the aggregate endowment of
all investors in the economy is lower than the total investment possibilities. Because
of this shortage of investment capital at date 0 entrepreneurs and bankers must o®er
an expected return as high as possible to attract funding. Entrepreneurs, investors
and bankers, whose role will be clari¯ed below, are risk-neutral but di®er in their
preferences: Investors and bankers have a strong preference for consumption at date
1, i.e. they have a very high discount rate ½ for consumption at date 2, whereas
entrepreneurs value consumption at each date equally. Investors can storage their
6See for instance Rochet and Vives (2002) for a very interesting model that shows how a lender of
last resort can avoid ine±cient liquidation of banks. Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (forthcoming) discuss
how the optimal LOLR policy is a®ected by moral hazard problems on side of the banks.
3initial endowment earning a return of 1 for every unit invested, or they can invest it in
the project.
Financing the projects includes some di±culties which have to be overcome. En-
trepreneurs have speci¯c abilities vis-a-vis their projects, i.e. the cash °ow each en-
trepreneur can generate from his project exceed what anyone else can get out of it.
But entrepreneurs cannot commit their human capital to the project, except on a spot
basis. From this it follows that a lender can extract future repayment only by threat-
ening to take away the project from the initial entrepreneur. The project returns C
generated by the initial entrepreneur are uncertain in terms of their time structure.
The project pays out C either at t1 if the project produces early or at t2 if the project
is delayed. All uncertainty about projects is resolved at date 1.
We consider two alternatives when taking away the project from an entrepreneur.
The project can be restructured at any time until date 1 which will yield a payo® c1
immediately and nothing at date 2, or the entrepreneur can be replaced with assets
redeployed to their next-best use, which does not change the timing of the produced
cash °ow but the level to °C with ° < 1. Both alternatives result in a loss of surplus,
since
c1 < 1 < °C < C; (1)
However, the big di®erence between this two alternative is the following: The second
alternative (replacement) can only be implemented by a bank who was the only initial
¯nancier of the project while restructuring can be done by any investor, irrespective of
having been an initial ¯nancier of the project or not.
How can we interpret these alternatives? Restructuring is an activity which can be
understood as changing the original content of the projects so that some immediate
cash can be produced without any speci¯c knowledge. One may think of this strategy
as abandoning the uncertain technology and using instead a commonly known technol-
ogy that produces goods quickly or stopping half-¯nished projects and salvaging the
production goods. All investors can realize this cash °ow, hence c1 is the secondary
market value of a project. On the other hand, replacing the entrepreneur and rede-
ploying the assets to their next-best use, which yields °C is an activity which demands
speci¯c skills for replacing the entrepreneur but preserving the original content of the
project. It may involve searching for a new entrepreneur who has similar skills to the
original one, or abandoning only such aspects of the project that were particulary de-
pendent on the old entrepreneur. Because this implies learning all about the project
it takes time, e®ort and a constant close contact to retain this skills. Therefore, we
assume that just one initial ¯nancier, e®ectively a "relationship lender" or banker who
4collect the savings of the investors, will undertake this costly activity. Accordingly, only
the banker knows the next-best use of the project's assets. To sum up, the bank can
realize ° ¢C from the project, if it takes the project away from the initial entrepreneur,
while other investors can only realize c1. Therefore, the initial entrepreneur will o®er
to repay ° ¢ C to a bank and only c1 to other investors.
How can we grasp the di®erences between ¯nancial systems in this modelling struc-
ture? One obvious di±culty lies in the fact that this framework taken at face value
allows only banks to exist as intermediaries. Capital markets in the literal sense as
institutions, where ¯rms issue stocks and bonds, households buy and trade these se-
curities and the resulting prices incorporate valuable information, are not caught in
our modelling structure. Yet what makes the framework attractive is the possibility to
grasp certain consequences of market-based and bank-based ¯nancial systems.
We view a bank-based system as a con¯guration with a relatively high ° and a
low c1 while the reverse, a relatively low ° and a high c1 is true in a market-based
system. A high ° points out that usually in a bank-based system the intermediary has
a great deal of information about her borrowers and their projects because of a long
lasting and close relationship. As a consequence, she can enforce higher repayments
from a borrower than a typical lender in a market-based system who does not collect as
much knowledge and information. So the banker in a bank-based system can "replace"
the entrepreneur easier, thereby retaining much of the original strategy of the initial
entrepreneur. This gives her bargaining power. In our opinion, this is an essential
characteristic of a bank with typically ¯rm-speci¯c knowledge.
On the other hand, c1 is the payo® of restructuring. Because this restructuring
is the best alternative, publicly available use, it can be interpreted as the market
value of these projects. A relatively high c1 indicates that much information about
the best alternative use is released in the market. In sum, we conclude that the
di®erence between °C and c1 is rather small in market-based systems.7 The assets are
relatively liquid because a great deal of information gets "externalized" through the
market activities. This re°ects the notion that there are many analysts working for
mutual funds, pension funds and other intermediaries who gather private information
and incorporate these through their trading activities in market prices which is the
general advantage of a market-based system.
In bank-based systems assets are more illiquid. In countries with bank-based sys-
tems, relatively few companies are listed and accounting disclosure requirements are
7Of course, we maintain the relation °C > 1 > c1 for a market-based system. Only the di®erence
is small.
5limited, so very little information is incorporated into stock prices. Also the number
of analysts who follow stocks is small, so only limited private information is incorpo-
rated into stock prices. However, intermediaries have more information available in
these systems. The greater prevalence of long term relationships, i.e. the "hausbank"-
relationship, in bank-based systems means that the banks are able to acquire consid-
erable information about the ¯rm they lend to. Typically this information will not
be released to the market; instead the information will be used internally to allow a
smooth functioning of the long term ¯nancial relationship and allocate resources e±-
ciently.8 Therefore information in a bank-based system is more or less " internalized",
outsiders to the ¯nancial relationship have only a small chance to get valuable infor-
mation.9 Banks have strong incentives to acquire and use information because they
can pro¯t from information which doesn't leak to outsiders. However, this creates the
problem that most of the assets are rather illiquid because only the banker has the rel-
evant information. This means c1 is small and the di®erence between °C, the payment
a bank can extract, and c1, the market value of a loan, is large.
We feel that this parametrization captures one of the most important underlying
causes of the observable di®erences between bank-based and market-based systems,
namely the di®erent ways of acquiring and using information in the respective systems.
2.2 Financial structure of ¯rms and banks
What complicates the ¯nancial relations in this economy is the presence of speci¯c skills
at two di®erent layers. First of all, original entrepreneurs with their speci¯c abilities
can generate a higher expected return from the projects than everyone else but they
cannot commit this human capital on a long term basis to the projects. Thus, projects
are illiquid in the sense that they cannot be ¯nanced to the full extent of their cash
°ows. The second layer causes the illiquidity of the loans. Only an initial lender has
speci¯c skills to extract high repayments from the entrepreneur but she also cannot
commit her human capital to the loan. For these reasons the ¯nancial contracts we
consider specify only who owns the physical assets conditional on the payments made.10
8See for instance Rajan (1992) and Gorton and Kahn (1992) for theoretical analysis and Elsas and
Krahnen (1998) and Berlin and Mester (1998) for empirical analysis.
9See Tyrell (2003) for a discussion how these two perspectives on information, i.e. externalization
and internalization, can be mapped into two approaches to the role of information in ¯nancial sys-
tems, namely the rational expectations literature on the role of prices in resource allocation and the
intermediation literature which is concerned with the role of banks as delegated monitors.
10We assume a court system, which can enforce ¯nancial contracts and transfer assets to lenders
when contracted repayments are defaulted upon, but cannot compel entrepreneurs or bankers to
6Let us turn to the resulting ¯nancial structure of a ¯rm ¯rst.
Initially the entrepreneur owns the machinery or project to produce goods. Since
he has no endowment, he needs to borrow to invest and is obliged to pay back the
credit later on. Hence, the contract signed by the entrepreneur speci¯es a repayment
and the assets the ¯nancier gets in case of default. Because of his speci¯c abilities
and the limited commitment of human capital, an entrepreneur can credibly threat
to withhold his human capital at any time until the cash °ows are produced. That
gives him bargaining power vis-a-vis the banker. Thus notwithstanding any ex-ante
agreement between entrepreneur and banker, the most the banker can get as repayment
for the credit is just her best outside option "replacement", which yields °C. Only by
threatening to take away the project and redeploy it to this next-best use, the banker as
an initial ¯nancier can extract this amount as future repayment for the credit. In turn,
this is also the maximum amount the entrepreneur can credibly pledge to an initial
¯nancier. Since the economy is short of investment capital at date 0, entrepreneurs
are competing for the scarce resources and only a few of them get a loan by bidding
the maximum amount they can credibly pay back. This means that in the ¯nancial
contract the borrower promise to pay the banker Pt = °C on demand. If, however,
the project turns out to be late and the entrepreneur cannot repay this amount and
defaults, the bank has the property rights over the project's assets and will decide what
to do with them next.
How can the banker re¯nance the project? Only the banker as an initial lender
knows the next best use of the project's assets. During the course of lending she
acquired speci¯c skills which she can use to collect more on the loan than other lenders
could do. Similar to an entrepreneur the banker possesses human capital that she
can threaten to hold back unless investors reduce the required payment. Thus, she
cannot commit to repaying to outside investors the full amount that she can extract
from an entrepreneur. This also implies that the banker may not be able to raise the
full present value of the loan held. But bankers themselves have no endowment, so
they have to ¯nd a way to re¯nance the loan through outside investors, otherwise they
cannot persuade investors to entrust them with their goods in t = 0. As a consequence,
the bank couldn't act as the only initial ¯nancier of an entrepreneur and the projects
wouldn't be ¯nanced.11
contribute their human capital. Thus the court can help to seize the project's assets or the bank's
loans, respectively. However, the value of these assets depends on the cash °ow the lenders can
generate out of the assets.
11Acquiring the speci¯c collection skills to enforce repayment on the part of an entrepreneur is a
costly activity which is not worth doing by a small investor in analogy to arguments given in Diamond
7As Diamond and Rajan (2001) show the bank can use a device to commit to re-
payment up to the full value of the loan. The bank should re¯nance lending by issuing
uninsured demand deposits subject to a sequential service constraint. The sequential
service constraint creates a collective action problem among depositors: If the bank
makes an attempt to renegotiate deposit repayments she will cause a run. Rather than
making concessions which may be in their collective interest, depositors ¯nd it in their
individual interest to run immediately to capture full repayment of their deposits. Be-
cause of the "¯rst come, ¯rst served" aspect of uninsured demand deposits, they cannot
be negotiated down. Individually each depositor has an incentive to withdraw his claims
as fast as possible because his payo® depends on his place in line. Thus withdrawing
is a Nash equilibrium. In case of a run depositors seize the assets and restructure all
the projects destroying any potential rent of the banker. It is not in the interest of a
bank to renegotiate down an ex-ante agreed repayment because courts would enforce
depositors' demands, and the rents of the banker would be destroyed. Therefore, the
bank's ability to create liquidity is inseparable from its potential fragility.12 Hence in
a world without uncertainty, a bank re¯nances entirely with demand deposits to max-
imizes the credit it can o®er to entrepreneurs. The possibility of runs exerts market
discipline on banks, although bank runs are never observed in equilibrium. Since the
banker can threat not to deploy her speci¯c collection skills on behalf of the investors
at any point after the deposit is made, deposits must be demandable at any time to
provide commitment value, even if consumption occurs only at date 1 or 2.
But a bank's capital structure typically involves (long-term) capital in addition to
demand deposits. The reason is that capital represents a softer claim than demand
deposits, i.e. a claim that can be renegotiated. In a world of uncertain project cash
°ows, ¯nancing with only demand deposits carries a cost. It impose the banks to
destructive runs if they truly cannot pay because the realized project cash °ows of
entrepreneurs are too low. In this way, Diamond and Rajan (2000) show that with
observable but not veri¯able uncertainty in project returns, it may be optimal for a
bank to partially ¯nance with a softer claim called capital. Capital holders cannot
commit not to renegotiate because they are not subject to a collective action problem.
Thus capital acts as a bu®er because its value adjusts to the underlying asset values
and can prevent ine±cient runs. On the other hand, this allows a banker to capture
some rents in the future and therefore reduces its ability to raise funds and creates
liquidity in the present. The optimal capital structure of a bank has to trade-o® these
(1984)
12See Diamond and Rajan (2001) for a full analysis of this mechanism.
8costs against the bene¯ts of capital.
In the following we assume that banks face a capital requirement k, stating that a
fraction k of the present value of a bank's assets has to be re¯nanced using capital.13
By normalizing our ¯nancing problem and the capital structure of the bank on one
investment project, we know that the bank assets are worth °C when the entrepreneur
can repay at date 1: Owing to the capital shortage at date 0, the bank extracts all
the rent from the entrepreneur that can be pledged, leaving the entrepreneur a rent of
(1 ¡ °)C. If D denotes the repayments on deposits , then °C ¡ D is the surplus that
can be split between the banker and the capital holder in the renegotiation process.
Assuming equal division of the surplus, capital owners will be paid 1
2(°C ¡ D) and
the same amount will be absorbed by the banker as a rent. It follows that D +
1
2(°C ¡ D) = 1
2(°C + D) will be passed on as total pledgable payment per loan to
depositors and investors holding a capital claim. Inserting this into the de¯nition
of the capital requirement (k =
1
2(°C¡D)
1
2(°C+D)) gives the maximum amount re¯nanced by
deposits: D = 1¡k
1+k°C. Hence, the banker gets a rent of k
1+k°C per ¯nished project and
capital owners get the same. Thus, the total value that can be pledged to outsiders
amounts to
°C
1+k.
2.3 Local lending markets and the time structure of the model
We argued in the last section that a banker acquires speci¯c collection skills vis-a-vis
entrepreneurs through her lending activity. But typically this experience or knowledge,
which is costly to develop, can only be acquired for a subset of the date 0 project
opportunities. For instance, a bank may only have experience in speci¯c industries or
possess knowledge about speci¯c locations. From this it follows that each bank has a
local monopoly in lending.
To simplify our analysis we assume that the economy is divided into two regions
of the same size. The two regions are ex ante at date 0 identical in every respect but
can become heterogenous at date 1 in the sense that the fraction of early projects in
the two regions di®er. More speci¯cally, ex ante the regions are populated by many
identical banks, each of them being a monopolist in their local market and facing an
identical pool of (many) entrepreneurs. With probability p1 no macroeconomic shock
occurs which means that all projects in both regions generate cash °ows in t = 1.
With probability 1 ¡ p1 a negative macroeconomic shock occurs which delays some
projects. In one region only a fraction ® of the bank loans generates cash °ows at date
13This requirement is either exogenously imposed by regulators or endogenously determined as a
result of - in our case unmodelled - uncertainty along the line of Diamond and Rajan (2000).
91 while in the other region a fraction ® of projects ¯nanced by banks produce early
cash °ows with ® > ®. Ex ante nobody knows which region will be hit by the more
severe macroeconomic shock. Thus, while banks are identical ex ante, in t1 half of
them turn out to be weak, i.e. having a higher fraction of delayed projects, while the
other half turns out to be strong, which means having a high fraction of projects that
generate an early return.
Closing this section, let us describe the time structure of the model. At date 0 the
ex ante identical banks compete for the investors' endowments. They issue a mix of
deposits and capital to investors and promise them the maximum pledgable amount
since consumption goods are short relative to projects at that date. Investors will
invest as long as their opportunity rate of return, i.e. storage, is met. After raising
cash, banks lend to entrepreneurs in their local lending market. We normalize without
loss of generality the amount each bank can raise at date 0 to be 1. In lending to
entrepreneurs the banks will charge the maximum repayment °C on demand.
Shortly before date 1 entrepreneurs learn if their projects are early or late. In
case the project is late, an entrepreneur informs his bank about the delay. Thus,
banks know before date 1 the fraction of their bank loans that turns out to be early
projects. As soon as a bank discovers that even with restructuring late projects it
cannot generate enough liquidity to payo® depositors, the banker tries to renegotiate
the deposit repayments. This will trigger right away a run and all the late projects will
be restructured to yield c1 immediately.
If their bank survives, entrepreneurs with early projects will repay °C at date 1.
These entrepreneurs have (1¡°)C at their disposal which they can either invest on the
liquidity market or consume. Entrepreneurs with late projects will default. Then the
bank decides how to deal with late projects. It can restructure the projects if liquidity
is needed at date 1 or it can reschedule the loan payment until date 2 and keep the
project as a going concern. Of course, what decision gives the bank a greater value
depends on the prevailing interest rate and its need for funds. A market for liquidity
is open at date 1 to equate supply and demand. The bank itself uses repayments from
the early entrepreneurs, from the restructured late projects, and the cash invested by
early entrepreneurs through the liquidity market in the bank (as deposits and capital)
to repay investors at date 1.
At date 2, the bank gets repayments from the unrestructured late projects. En-
trepreneurs will consume.
103 Stability of an individual bank
In this section we want to analyze the stability of an individual bank. It is important
to understand how decisions in the bank will be taken because of their in°uence on the
stability and the payo®s of the three stakeholder groups of the bank: bankers, capital
owners, and depositors. The optimal decision concerning restructuring or continuing
late projects depends on the particular interest rate r that occurs in date t = 1.14
Although the bank manager would always prefer to continue late projects, since only
when continuing he earns a rent but gets nothing in case of restructuring, the capi-
tal owners will force the banker to maximize the net present value of the projects.15
The capital owners of the bank want to consume at date 1 and therefore they try to
maximize the t1-consumption goods available to the bank. This means they will force
the banker to restructure a project if c1 >
°C
(1+k)r and let she continue it otherwise,
i.e. if c1 ·
°C
(1+k)r. We will denote this hurdle rate with ~ r =
°C
(1+k)c1. The higher the
interest rate for getting liquidity, the more valuable is restructuring because it gen-
erates liquidity immediately. But this restructuring decision is biased, because only
part of late projects' return is pledgable to outside ¯nanciers of the bank. As long as
c1 <
°C
(1+k)r +
k°C
(1+k)½ + (1 ¡ °)C, it is socially ine±cient to restructure late projects.
Turning to the decision of depositors, we already mentioned that it is individually
rational for them to withdraw their funds whenever the net present value of the bank
at date 1 is not enough to ful¯ll their claims. Consequently, a run on the particular
bank is triggered whenever the sum of deposits exceeds the net present value of the
bank at date 1: D ¸ V1.16
Therefore, given that capital owners force bankers to restructure late projects be-
14In the following analysis we have taken the banks' date 0 portfolio decision concerning investment
in storage and lending as given and analyze the case where the bank will not store but invest any
funds in lending activity. We are sure this is the optimal decision when the probability p1 for the
state where all the projects in both regions are early, is su±ciently high.
15We will use the terms banker and bank manager synonymously. The banker will continue the
project despite having a strong preference for date 1 consumption. This means that even with a high
discount rate of date 2 consumption the present value of the rent she can earn is positive.
16Clearly, as in Diamond/Dybvig there exist two pure strategy equilibria in those cases where
D < V1 but D > c1. Under these circumstances the individually rational decision of every depositor
depend on his belief about the decision of all other depositors. As long as he expects the others to
withdraw he also has an incentive to do so. But if he thinks the others will wait until t = 1 he is also
inclined to withdraw not before t = 1. Here we assume that depositors will always wait until t = 1 as
long as D · V1.
11cause r >
°C
(1+k)c1, depositors will run if
V1 = ®°C + (1 ¡ ®)c1 < D =
1 ¡ k
1 + k
°C: (2)
Solving for (1 ¡ ®) gives the critical level of late projects that triggers a run:
1 ¡ ® >
2k
1 + k
°C
°C ¡ c1
:
However, if late projects are continued because r ·
°C1
(1+k)c1 depositors will run if
V1 = ®°C + (1 ¡ ®)
°C
(1 + k)r
< D =
1 ¡ k
1 + k
°C: (3)
Thus, given that capital owner want to continue late projects a run will occur if
the interest rate increases beyond:
r =
1
1 ¡ k 1+®
1¡®
: (4)
It is easy to see that this interest rate level increases with ® and k. A higher fraction
of early projects just like a higher capital ratio increases the stability of a bank. In the
following analysis we assume that the fraction of early projects in the strong region is
high enough that the liquidity in°ow from early projects is su±cient to repay deposits.
Thus, strong banks (those with the higher fraction of early projects) never depend on
the liquidity raised at the t1-¯nancial market to prevent a run. Therefore a run on
these banks can never be triggered by interest rate increases. However, weak banks
we assume to be dependent on the liquidity in°ow from ¯nancial market transactions
to repay depositors. Following equation (3) this means that we restrict our parameter
space to
® >
1 ¡ k
1 + k
> ®: (5)
Accordingly, we de¯ne ^ r = 1
1¡k
1+®
1¡®
and ^ ^ r = 1
1¡k 1+®
1¡®
as the critical interest rate level
which determine the capital owners' decision on restructuring vs. continuing late
projects in weak respectively strong banks.
4 Equilibrium in the liquidity market
The gross liquidity produced in the economy is the return on early projects. But part
of the liquidity goes to banks, which split it into rents to the banker, return to capital
owners and repayment to depositors. Since we assume that bank managers, capital
owners as well as depositors have a discount rate of t2- consumption that exceeds
12any upper bound of the equilibrium interest rate, they will immediately consume this
fraction of the liquidity. The other part of the liquidity produced by early projects
are the rents of the entrepreneurs. Since they do not discount future consumption,
they will supply their liquidity at the t1-¯nancial market, as long as they get at least
a return of 1. Given the overall fraction (® + ®) of early projects in both regions, the
aggregate liquidity supply amounts to:
L
S = (® + ®)(1 ¡ °)C (6)
Because all the stake holders in the bank - bank manager, capital owner and deposi-
tors - have a strong preference for immediate consumption in t1, the bank manager will
try to raise liquidity against the pledgable income of late projects, in order to repay
deposits, pay the return on capital and consume his own rents.
Proposition 1 In the secondary ¯nancial market banks try to borrow liquidity from
early entrepreneurs against the pledgable return of late projects.
In competing for the ¯xed liquidity supply of early entrepreneurs banks bid up the
interest rate. An increase in the interest rate reduces the present value of the future
pledgable income and the liquidity that each bank can raise.
For an interest rate that only sightly exceeds 1 this simply reduces the rents of the
bank managers and the return of bank capital owners. As long as the interest rate does
not increase beyond the threshold level ^ r = 1
1¡k
1+®
1¡®
banks in both regions are stable
and will raise new funds against the pledgable return of their late projects from early
entrepreneurs in the given mixture of capital and deposits. The demand for liquidity
is given by the pledgable return of both type of banks' late projects discounted with
the respective interest rate: (2 ¡ ® ¡ ®)
°¢C
(1+k)¢r.
But for interest rates above ^ r the liquidity available to weaker banks falls short
of the liquidity needed to repay all depositors. Banks with the higher fraction of late
projects will be subject to a run of its depositors. The depositors will seize the banks'
late projects and restructure them. Therefore, beyond an interest rate of ^ r weak banks
will not demand any liquidity at the ¯nancial market. In contrast, the stronger banks
can still raise enough liquidity to repay their depositors. Since the fraction of late
projects is smaller at these bank, the fraction of liquidity provided by in°ows from
selling assets in the t1-¯nancial market is smaller and the liquidity available to these
bank is less dependant on the interest rate. Therefore, at interest rates above the
threshold level ^ r only the strong banks demand liquidity against the future pledgable
return of their late projects.
13However, at an interest rate exceeding ~ r =
°¢C
(1+k)¢c1 even strong banks get into
trouble. But not due to a run of their depositors. The liquidity available to these
banks is even at this threshold level enough to repay the deposits.17 At an interest rate
above ~ r the returns to capital owners are higher if projects are restructured in order to
generate early returns. Thus, bankers will be forced by capital owners not to continue
late projects but to restructure them. But if there is no late project continued in the
economy at an interest rate above ~ r there is no demand for liquidity at all.
If the interest rate meets exactly the threshold level ~ r capital owners are indi®erent
between restructuring and continuing late projects, so the demand for liquidity - the
fraction of continued late projects - is undetermined in that case.
Altogether, the aggregate liquidity demand in the economy can be summarized by:
L
D =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0 r > ~ r h
0;(1 ¡ ®)
°¢C
(1+k)¢^ r
i
r = ~ r
(1 ¡ ®)
°¢C
(1+k)¢r ^ r < r < ~ r
(2 ¡ ® ¡ ®)
°¢C
(1+k)¢r r · ^ r
(7)
Obviously, given this aggregate liquidity demand three qualitatively very di®erent
equilibria occur depending on the aggregate liquidity supply, which is given by the
overall fraction of early projects in the economy.
Proposition 2 Depending on the aggregate fraction of late projects three types of ¯-
nancial crises may emerge. 1) Slight liquidity crises, in which no bank collapses, 2)
moderate liquidity crises, in which only weak banks are subject to a run and 3) severe
liquidity squeezes, which also destabilize stronger banks.
Given that the overall fraction of late projects is rather limited, a slight liquidity
crises occurs. This case is depicted in ¯gure 1. Trying to attract new funds from the
early entrepreneurs against the required mixture of deposits and capital banks bid up
the interest rate only slightly to
r
¤ =
2 ¡ ® ¡ ®
® + ®
¢
°
1 ¡ °
¢
1
1 + k
(8)
But this only reduces the rents of the bank manager and the return of capital
owners. It does not destabilize any bank in the economy.
Obviously, the interest rate in slight liquidity crises is the higher the larger the
aggregate fraction of late projects relative to the fraction of early projects and the
17Note that we assumed ~ r always being below the interest rate level at which the strong bank cannot
raise enough liquidity to repay deposits: ^ r < ~ r < ^ ^ r.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in a slight liquidity crisis
higher the relation of pledgable to non-pledgable income of ¯nished projects, since
both determine the relative scarcity of liquidity in t1. Moreover, the interest rate is
higher if the capital requirements are smaller, since capital requirements increase the
rents of the banker and thereby reduce the returns of late project that can be promised
to new depositors and capital owners in t1.
However, if the "cash in the market"-constraint is more restrictive, i.e. the aggregate
fraction of early projects smaller, the economy ends up in a moderate liquidity crises,
in which part of the banking sector collapses. In that case, which is shown in ¯gure 2,
the lack of liquidity causes the equilibrium interest rate to climb up to
r
¤¤ =
1 ¡ ®
® + ®
¢
°
1 ¡ °
¢
1
1 + k
(9)
At this level the liquidity in°ow at weak banks is insu±cient to meet the repayment
to depositors. Therefore, the banks with the stronger liquidity needs will fail, whereas
the stronger banks, which are less dependent on the liquidity in°ow from transaction in
the t1-¯nancial market will not be destabilized by the liquidity squeeze and will continue
all late projects. As the weak banks fail their depositors seize the late projects and
restructure them. Since weak banks do not demand liquidity in the ¯nancial market
at this interest rate levels, the equilibrium interest rate in a moderate liquidity crises
only depends on the relation 1) of late projects at strong banks to the overall fraction
on early projects, 2) of pledgable to non-pledgable income of ¯nished projects and 3)
of returns bank can pledge to new depositors and capital owners to her total return.
So roughly spoken, in a moderate liquidity crises only part of the banking sector
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Figure 2: Equilibrium in a moderate liquidity crisis
that is subject to a more or less idiosyncratic adverse liquidity shock will collapse.
The other part of the banking sector that does not face a severe idiosyncratic liquidity
shock, because only a limited fraction of its projects turns out to be late, can ¯nish all
projects.
In contrast, if the aggregate fraction of late projects is even higher the economy
ends up in a severe liquidity crisis. In this case the equilibrium interest rate will reach
its upper bound
r
¤¤¤ = ~ r (10)
Obviously, at this interest rate level weak banks collapse. But what di®erentiates a
moderate from a severe liquidity crisis is that in the latter even strong banks have to
restructure part of their late projects. At the equilibrium interest rate ~ r capital owners
are indi®erent between restructuring and continuing late projects. However, the avail-
able liquidity is insu±cient to repay all depositors. Therefore, the bank manager, who
only receives a rent if projects are ¯nished, will restructure just enough late projects
to produce su±cient liquidity to prevent a run. The fraction of late projects that can
be continued in a severe liquidity crises is given in equilibrium by
¹
¤¤¤ =
® + ®
1 ¡ ®
¢
(1 ¡ °)
°
¢
(1 ¡ k) ¢ ~ r
1
=
® + ®
1 ¡ ®
¢
(1 ¡ °)
°
¢
° ¢ C
c1
(11)
Apparently, this fraction will be higher 1) the larger the aggregate fraction of early
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Figure 3: Equilibrium in a severe liquidity crisis
projects relative to the fraction of late projects at strong banks, 2) the higher the
non-pledgable returns of entrepreneurs in relation to the pledgable returns going to the
banks and 3) the smaller the present value of the fraction of the banks' returns that
can credibly be promised to new capital owners and depositors at the given interest
rate ~ r. Inserting the equilibrium value for ~ r into the last expression shows that this
is just the relation between the pledgable return of late projects if continued to the
return of these projects if restructured (see equation (11)). Consequently, if continuing
late projects gives a higher return to banks relative to restructuring, a higher fraction
of late projects will be ¯nished even in a severe liquidity shortage.
To sum up, in a severe liquidity shortage it is not enough that weak banks fail
and therefore stop demanding liquidity. If the aggregate fraction of late projects is too
high, even those banks that have ¯nanced a comparatively small fraction of projects
that turn out to be late will not be able to raise enough liquidity at the ¯nancial
market. However, these liquidity rationed banks do not collapse, but they will have to
restructure late projects to raise su±cient liquidity to repay deposits.
Having described the equilibrium in the ¯nancial market it is straightforward to
see which impact the particular type of the ¯nancial system has on the equilibrium.
Obviously, the higher fraction of pledgable income (°) in bank-dominated ¯nancial
systems shifts the entire liquidity demand to the upper right. Because the higher the
pledgable income the higher the present value of late projects and the more aggressive
banks can bid for funds in t1 in slight and moderate liquidity crises. In severe liquidity
17crises the higher return on late projects makes capital owners more willing to accept
a continuation of late projects even for higher interest rates. On the supply side a
higher fraction of pledgable income reduces the return of early entrepreneurs, thereby
lowering the liquidity supply in the economy. All these e®ects of a higher fraction of
pledgable returns point in same direction: Fluctuations of the interest rate in case of a
¯nancial crisis are higher in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems than in market-oriented
¯nancial systems. This is also re°ected in the respective equations of the equilibrium
interest rate (see equations (8), (9) and (10))
A lower return on restructured projects (c1), which we also characterized as being
typical for a bank-dominated ¯nancial system only in°uences the equilibrium interest
rate in severe liquidity crises. The lower the returns from restructuring late projects
the higher the interest rate up to which capital owners will accept a continuation of
late projects of the bank manager. Thus, as can also be seen in equation (10), the
interest rate °uctuations in severe liquidity crises also increase with a lower c1 and are
therefore higher in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems.
It is interesting to note, that also the threshold level for the di®erent ¯nancial crises
with respect to a given liquidity supply depends on the type of the ¯nancial system.
Inserting ~ r into the liquidity demand one can derive the threshold level for aggregate
liquidity supply between moderate and severe liquidity crises. This shows that if the
aggregate liquidity supply falls short of (1 ¡ ®) ¢ c1 the economy ends up in a severe
crisis. While this threshold level obviously is not in°uenced by the fraction of pledgable
returns, it rises the higher the returns on restructured projects. Thus, in market-
oriented ¯nancial systems, in which c1 is higher, the economy ends up more often in a
severe liquidity crisis, while in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems given a certain level
of aggregate liquidity supply moderate liquidity crises are more likely. Similarly, the
threshold level between slight and moderate liquidity crises can be derived by inserting
^ r into the liquidity demand function showing that in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems
characterized by a high ° it is more likely to be in a moderate than in a slight liquidity
crisis.
Proposition 3 In bank-dominated ¯nancial systems interest rate °uctuations are higher
during ¯nancial crises than in market-oriented ¯nancial systems. Moderate liquidity
crises are more likely in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems, while in market-oriented
¯nancial systems severe but also slight liquidity crises are more likely to occur.
185 Optimal LOLR-policy
Restructuring late projects is always welfare reducing in this economy. If the interest
rate is below ~ r this is most obvious, since in that case the net present value of the
pledgable income from late projects that can credibly be promised to capital owners
and depositors of the bank is higher than the returns generated if the projects are
restructured.
c1 <
°¢C
(1+k)¢r for r <
°¢C
(1+k)¢c1
However, even in a severe liquidity crisis, where the equilibrium interest rate reaches
~ r and the present value of the pledgable returns of continued late projects that can
be credibly promised to outside ¯nanciers of the bank is therefore equal to the return
of restructured late projects, it would still be strictly welfare improving to ¯nish all
projects. If late projects are continued entrepreneurs as well as bankers will earn a
rent, while they both get nothing if projects are restructured. Since both rents are
not pledgable they are never taken into account by capital owners of banks, when they
decide to force the bankers to restructure late projects.
But besides the fact that parts of the returns a ¯nished investment project generates
can not be passed on by entrepreneurs and bank manager, which distorts the decision of
bank owners to continue late projects, what contributes to the ine±cient termination
of late project is the bank's re¯nancing through deposits. What is in general the
advantage of demand deposits - the threat of a coordination failure among depositors
that allows bankers to credibly commit to repay - turns out to be a serious drawback
in a liquidity crises particularly for weak banks. Banks are not able to bargain on the
repayment of deposits in a crises situation to ¯nish late projects.
A LOLR can provide banks with additional liquidity. To keep the analysis as
simple as possible, we assume that the LOLR can raise the liquidity by taxing t1-
consumption. This can be interpreted as a shortcut for an in°ation tax: The central
bank as the LOLR increases the currency in circulation by providing additional means
of payments to the banks to enable them to settle their nominal obligations. Since
this increases the money supply without changing the contemporaneous provision of
goods, it simply reduces the real value of money in terms of t1-consumption goods. It
therefore resembles a taxation of any t1-consumption in the economy.18
However, the provision of liquidity by the LOLR is associated with a cost. An
in°ation tax just like any other tax (apart from per capita taxes) brings about ine±-
18For a more detailed discussion of this argument see Allen and Gale (1998).
19ciencies in the economy that cause welfare losses. For simplicity we take these welfare
losses (WL) as an exogenous cost, that increases proportional with the volume of the
liquidity assistance (LA): WL = ¯ ¢ LA.
There are two distinct policies the LOLR can follow in providing the liquidity to
the banking sector in a crisis. The ¯rst option, which captures the basic features of
Bagehot's suggestions, is to supply liquidity to the market by buying ¯nancial assets,
i.e. bank equity or deposits. In doing so the LOLR can stabilize the interest rate and
prevent the banks from restructuring late projects. The second option, which re°ects
a more discrete policy, is to provide liquidity assistance to individual banks. Applying
this policy the LOLR can supply liquidity at di®erent terms to di®erent banks.
In a slight liquidity crisis there is no need for a LOLR-intervention. All late projects
are continued in spite of the liquidity shortage. The interest rate increase due to
the slight liquidity squeeze only raises the consumption of early entrepreneurs at the
expense of bank managers and bank capital owners. Therefore, a slight liquidity crisis
only causes a reallocation of resources, that does not bring about any ine±ciencies.
Proposition 4 In a slight liquidity crisis there is no need for a lender of last resort,
since all late projects are continued anyway.
In a moderate liquidity crisis weak banks are threatened by a run in which depositors
would seize the assets and restructure the late projects. Therefore, a liquidity assistance
to prevent this could be bene¯cial.
If the LOLR decided to supply the weak banks with the funds to repay the deposits
through an individual assistance (IA), the amount of liquidity the LOLR has to provide
is given by deposits less the liquidity available to the bank from the returns on early
projects:
LA
IA
m = D ¡ ® ¢ ° ¢ C (12)
The LOLR o®ers the liquidity assistance at the interest rate ^ r against the future
income of late projects that can be promised to outside ¯nanciers of the bank. So in
t1 there is just enough liquidity available to the bank to repay depositors. Therefore,
the LOLR-assistance enables depositors to collect the full value of their deposits (D)
from late projects not just the return generated by restructuring (c1). Using the LOLR
assistance even bank managers and bank capital owners gain since they can at least
realize their rents from late projects (
2¢k¢°¢C
1+k ). However, since these rents are realized in
t2 they have to be discounted with the rather high discount factor ½ of bank managers
20and capital owners.19 In addition, the LOLR-assistance enabling the continuation
of late projects also preserves the rents of late entrepreneurs. In sum, an individual
liquidity assistance in a moderate liquidity crisis can generate welfare gains that amount
to:
WG
IA
m = (1 ¡ ®)
·
D ¡ c1 + (1 ¡ °)C +
2k
1 + k
¢
°C
½
¸
¡ ¯ [D ¡ ®°C] (13)
If the LOLR uses market interventions to prevent ine±cient restructuring of late
projects in a moderate liquidity crisis he has to provide additional liquidity to the
market up to the point where the interest rate is reduced to ^ r. At this level weak
banks get just enough liquidity against the future pledgable returns of late projects to
repay deposits. However, the additional liquidity the LOLR has to provide in that case
is larger than if he uses an individual liquidity assistance. In addition to the liquidity
needed at weak banks to repay depositors, the LOLR also has to meet the increase
in liquidity demand of strong banks due to the interest rate reduction. Therefore, the
overall liquidity supply by the LOLR using market intervention (MI) amounts to:
LA
MI
m = LA
IA
m + (1 ¡ ®) ¢
·
° ¢ C
(1 + k) ¢ ^ r
¡
° ¢ C
(1 + k) ¢ r¤¤
¸
(14)
However, there are no welfare gains associated with the increased liquidity provi-
sion. The additional funds available to strong banks in t1 only increase the consump-
tion of bank managers and capital owners at the expense of the consumption of early
entrepreneurs. This reallocation is neutral in terms of the overall welfare.
Therefore, the larger volume of liquidity provided in a market intervention does not
bring about any bene¯ts but causes additional costs. Thus a market intervention is
always inferior in a moderate liquidity crises. The ine±ciency of a market intervention
is the higher the bigger the costs of the waste of liquidity. Inserting ^ r and r¤¤ into
(14) the welfare losses from using market interventions in moderate liquidity crises are
given by:
WG
IA
m ¡ WG
MI
m = ¯(1 ¡ ®)
·
(1 ¡ ®) ¡ k(1 + ®)
(1 ¡ ®)
¢
°C
(1 + k)
¡
(® + ®)(1 ¡ °)C
(1 ¡ ®)
¸
(15)
Obviously, the ine±ciency of a market intervention are more severe:
1. the larger the fraction of late projects at strong banks because
a) on the one hand this increases the additional liquidity demand of strong banks
19Remember that we assumed a discount rate for these agents that always exceeds the equilibrium
interest rate. Therefore: ½ > ~ r.
21and
b) on the other hand this reduces the supplied liquidity by early entrepreneurs in
the economy, thereby increasing the liquidity that has to be supplied additionally
to strong banks,
2. the larger the fraction of late projects at weak banks, because
a) on the one hand this reduces the liquidity supplied by early entrepreneurs,
too, and
b) on the other hand this reduces the threshold level to which the LOLR has to
bring down the interest rate to prevent a run on these banks,
3. the smaller the capital requirements, which is also mainly due to the reduction
of liquidity demand by raising capital requirements and
4. the lower the fraction of non-pledgable income (the higher the pledgable return
on late projects), also because a higher pledgable return increases additional
liquidity demand of strong banks.
Consequently, in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems, which are particularly charac-
terized by comparatively high levels of pledgable income, the ine±ciencies of market
interventions are more severe, whereas they are relatively limited in market-oriented
systems.
Proposition 5 If a LOLR-intervention is bene¯cial at all in a moderate liquidity
shortages an individual liquidity assistance is always preferable over a market-intervention.
However, the e±ciency loss of a market intervention is higher in bank-dominated ¯-
nancial systems.
In a severe liquidity crisis not only late projects at weak banks but also some of the
delayed projects at strong banks would be restructured without an additional liquidity
supply by a LOLR.
Applying individual liquidity assistance in a severe liquidity squeeze, the LOLR
would have to supply to weak banks the same amount of liquidity as in moderate
crises. In order to prevent the ine±cient restructuring of late projects at weak banks the
LOLR has to provide the additional liquidity that weak banks need to repay depositors
at the threshold level ^ r. But in addition to prevent the ine±cient restructuring at
strong banks the LOLR has to supply them with the funds needed to ¯nish their late
projects, too. However, at strong banks it is not a potential run that could bring about
the restructuring of late projects. At these banks it is the capital owners that do not
22allow the manager to pay higher interest rates than ~ r on funds allowing to continue
late projects. Bank managers can use only the liquidity they get at ~ r, to ¯nish late
projects, while they have to restructure the remaining delayed projects. Therefore, the
LOLR simply has to supply the additional liquidity that strong banks need to continue
all late projects at ~ r. Thus, given the fraction of restructured late projects at strong
banks without a LOLR-intervention (1 ¡ ¹¤¤¤) the overall liquidity the LOLR has to
provide to the banking system amounts to:
LA
IA
s = D ¡ ®°C + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¹
¤¤¤)
°C
(1 + k) ~ r
(16)
Besides the welfare gains due to preventing the restructuring at weak banks in a
severe crisis the LOLR-policy increases welfare by enabling strong banks to continue
their late projects, too. However, since at strong banks depositors are repayed anyway,
only bank managers, capital owners and late entrepreneurs bene¯t from the LOLR
intervention, since their rents are preserved. Thus inserting the equilibrium values of
¹¤¤¤ and ~ r in a severe crisis overall welfare gains from an individual liquidity assistance
are given by:
WG
IA
s = WG
IA
m + (1 ¡ ¹)
·
(1 ¡ °)C +
2k
1 + k
°C
½
¸
¡ ¯ ((1 ¡ ®)c1 + (® + ®)(1 ¡ °)C) (17)
In contrast, if the LOLR pursues a market intervention he has to provide enough
liquidity to bring down the interest rate to ^ r, just like in a moderate liquidity squeeze.
But again in order to do so, it is not su±cient to supply the same amount of liquidity
to the market. At ^ r strong banks do not just demand the liquidity needed to ¯nish all
late projects. Since the present value of their late projects is higher at ^ r than at ~ r the
additional liquidity they demand is given by:
LA
MI
s ¡ LA
IA
s = (1 ¡ ®)
·
°C
(1 + k)^ r
¡
°C
((1 + k)r¤¤¤
¸
(18)
But this additional liquidity provision again only brings about a reallocation of
consumption between the bank managers and capital owners on the one hand and
early entrepreneurs on the other. Thus, there are no overall welfare gains associated
with this additional liquidity supply, only extra costs to raise these additional fund.
Consequently, compared to an individual liquidity assistance market interventions are
also ine±cient in severe liquidity crises. Inserting ^ r and ~ r into (19) the welfare gains
from using an individual liquidity assistance instead of a market intervention as the
LOLR-policy in a severe liquidity crises are given by:
23WG
IA
s ¡ WG
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s = ¯(1 ¡ ®)
·
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(1 ¡ ®)
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¸
(19)
Obviously, applying individual liquidity assistance as the LOLR-policy is the more
preferable in severe liquidity crises:
1. the larger the fraction of late projects at strong banks, because this raises the
ine±cient additional liquidity demand of strong banks,
2. the larger the fraction of late projects at weak banks, because an increase in the
fraction of late projects at weak banks reduces the threshold level to which the
LOLR has to bring down the interest rate to prevent a run on these banks,
3. the smaller the capital requirements, which is also mainly due to the reduction
of liquidity demand by increasing capital requirements,
4. the higher the pledgable return on late projects, also because this increases ad-
ditional liquidity demand of strong banks and and
5. the lower the return on restructured projects, since the lower c1 the higher the
di®erence between the interest rate in a market intervention ^ r and the highest
sustainable interest rate for strong banks ~ r and therefore the higher the additional
(wasted) liquidity provision to strong banks in a market intervention.
Proposition 6 In a severe liquidity crisis an individual liquidity assistance is always
preferable over a market-intervention, too. Again, the e±ciency loss of a market inter-
vention is higher in bank-dominated ¯nancial systems than in a market-based ¯nancial
system.
To sum up, in all kinds of liquidity crises in which a LOLR-intervention is bene¯cial
an individual liquidity assistance is strictly preferable. However, the welfare gains of
an individual liquidity assistance compared to a market intervention vary with the par-
ticular parameter setting of the respective economy. Most interestingly, an individual
liquidity assistance is in general more preferable the more the parametrization of the
economy resembles a bank-dominated ¯nancial system. For instance, in both moderate
as well as severe liquidity crises a high relation of pledgable to non pledgable income
in ¯nancial relations between ¯rms and banks (a higher °), which is due to the rela-
tionship lending most characteristic for bank-dominated ¯nancial systems, makes an
individual liquidity assistance more preferable. Moreover, relatively low returns from
restructured projects (c1), which is also typical for bank-dominated ¯nancial system
24compared to market oriented ¯nancial systems, make an individual assistance more
bene¯cial, too.
So far we did not take into account the di®erent informational requirements of the
LOLR-policies. However, it is obvious that an individual liquidity assistance requires
much more information to be e®ective than a market intervention.
To pursue an individual liquidity assistance the LOLR has to collect precise infor-
mation about the liquidity needs of every single bank.20 Besides the administrative
costs, this takes time and may cause an ine±cient delay of the LOLR-intervention.
This is particularly true, since banks do not have an incentive to honestly report their
liquidity needs to the LOLR. By overstating the fraction of late projects bank man-
agers could increase the individual liquidity assistance and at the same time reduce the
interest rate the LOLR demands on the provided liquidity. Both increases their rents.
In contrast, if the LOLR applies market interventions, the LOLR only has to keep
the interest rate in the money market at the threshold level ^ r. Given that the lower
bound (1 ¡ ®) of the distribution of the fraction of late project is public information,
there is no information on individual banks required by the LOLR.
In order to take these considerations into account but keep the analysis tractable
we assume that there are some ¯xed informational costs associated with a policy of
individual liquidity assistance.
So obviously, given these additional costs a policy of individual liquidity assistance
is only preferable if the welfare gains of this LOLR-policy outweighs these costs. But as
we have already argued the gains of an individual liquidity assistance di®er with respect
to the ¯nancial system under consideration. Thus, in a bank-dominated ¯nancial
system in which the e±ciency gains of an individual liquidity assistance are relatively
large in moderate as well as in severe liquidity crises it is rather likely that a LOLR
prefers to bear the additional information costs in order to be able to pursue this
LOLR-policy. In contrast, in market-oriented ¯nancial systems, where the drawback
of market interventions is in both types of ¯nancial crises less severe, the LOLR may
decide to save the costs of acquiring the required information for an individual liquidity
assistance and use market interventions to provide the banking system with additional
liquidity.
Proposition 7 Taking into account, that there are more cost intense information re-
quirements associated with an individual liquidity assistance, a LOLR-policy based on
20We assume that the LOLR cannot observe the region the bank is located in. Thus, the regions
should not be taken literally but can be interpreted as sectors of the economy which are in°icted in
di®erent for outsiders not easily observable ways by the macroeconomic shock.
25individual liquidity assistance may be preferable in bank-based ¯nancial system but not
in market-oriented ¯nancial systems.
6 Conclusions
In this paper on liquidity crises and lender of last resort policies we can distinguish
between three di®erent types of crisis situations. In a slight liquidity crisis there is
no need for a lender of last resort. No banks are subject to a run, the only thing we
observe is a slight increase of interest rates. In contrast, a moderate liquidity crisis
is characterized by runs on weak banks. Depositors seize assets and late projects will
be restructured. Finally, in a severe liquidity crisis not only runs on weak banks can
be observed but also strong banks will be liquidity rationed and have to partially
restructure their late projects. Accordingly, in a moderate and in a severe liquidity
crisis the intervention of a lender of last resort may be preferable to prevent runs from
occurring.
However, from our main results we can draw a connection between ¯nancial system
con¯gurations and the optimal lender of last resort policy, i.e. a market intervention
following Bagehots' rules and lending liquidity freely at penalty rates, or an individual
liquidity assistance provided discretionary by the lender of last resort.
In a moderate as well as in a severe liquidity crisis individual liquidity assistance
guarantees a more e±cient allocation of the provided liquidity. However, in both crisis
situations the welfare losses due to the ine±cient waste of liquidity are higher in bank-
dominated ¯nancial systems than in market-oriented ¯nancial systems. Thus, taking
into account the more costly informational requirements of a lender of last resort that
follows a policy of an individual liquidity assistance it may follow that the information
costs outweigh the e±ciency gain from a individual liquidity assistance in a market-
oriented but not in a bank-oriented ¯nancial system.
Presumably, this argument in favor of a market intervention in market-oriented
¯nancial systems can further be strengthened: By incorporating into the analysis that
a market intervention proportionally wastes more liquidity in the moderate than in
the severe liquidity crises, we get lower e±ciency loss from market intervention in a
severe liquidity crisis if the informational costs of the LOLR increase with the amount
of liquidity provided on an individual basis. Having in mind that, as we showed in
Proposition 3, under reasonable assumption a market-oriented system is more often in
a severe than in a moderate liquidity crisis, this also implies lower e±ciency losses of a
market intervention in a market-oriented system.
26Of course, there are important quali¯cations to this conclusion. Our model is
incomplete in at least three aspects, which we want to analyze in future research.
First of all we have to determine endogenously the decision of a lender of last resort to
examine and inspect the banks who seek liquidity support in di®erent ¯nancial systems.
Secondly, in future work we want to elaborate on the ex ante decision of a bank about
investing in projects and in storage technology. Thirdly and may be most important,
our model is quiet about possible moral hazard behavior of banks induced by a lender
of last resort. The only thing we can say for sure is that in our framework banks in
bank-dominated systems acquire higher rents than banks in a market-oriented system,
since the activity of the former are more ¯rm-speci¯c. Of course, these di®erences
a®ect their behavior. In which direction the behavior will be in°uenced, that would be
a very interesting and important topic of the LOLR policy analysis in the context of
di®erent ¯nancial systems.
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